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Held Captive: How Increased Regulation Arrests
Railroads' Ability to Serve the Nation
Beau B. Bump*
I. INTRODUCTION
On a macroscopic level, every regulatory policy debate ultimately
contemplates the economic system that is best for our country. Free
enterprise and socialism occupy opposite ends of the spectrum; be-
tween the two extremes is a sliding scale in which aspects of each eco-
nomic system combine with aspects of the other to strike a proper
balance between unregulated competition and pervasive government
control.' The United States of America has long prided itself in attain-
ing that balance through a modified free enterprise system that tem-
pers private competition with mild government regulation. 2 The
nation's markets champion competition as their central ethos, while
privately-owned industries begrudgingly accept government regula-
tion as a necessary evil and crucial check on the entire system. 3 Some
industries, however, have been subject to more pervasive regulation
than others:4 in particular, industries whose services garner a high de-
* Juris Doctor from DePaul University College of Law expected 2008; Bachelor of Arts in
English from University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2004.
1. See generally BENJAMIN N. WARD, THE SOCIALIST ECONOMY: A STUDY OF ORGANIZA-
TIONAL ALTERNATIVES (1967). The hallmarks of these economic systems are privatization and
nationalization, respectively, which describe a government's relationship to its country's means
of production. Private ownership of the means of production prevails in a free enterprise econ-
omy, whereas government ownership predominates in a socialist economy. Id.
2. CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN
THE TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC UTILITY INDUSTRIES 3 (1965).
The economy of the United States is often described as a competitive, private enter-
prise system. The largest part of the economy is organized on the decentralized lines of
private property and private enterprise. The market, therefore, is the central institution
regulating economic activity. But it must also be recognized that business is affected in
many ways ... by the activities of government.
Id.
3. See id. ("[I1n a broad sense all industries are regulated. Governmental laws which affect
business include antitrust policy, fair trade laws, labor legislation, monetary and fiscal policy,
public expenditures, and tariff policy.").
4. JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 4 (1961) (delineating two
major categories of regulated industries: "(1) those enterprises which supply, directly or indi-
rectly, continuous or repeated services through more or less permanent physical connections
between the plant of the supplier and the premises of the consumer; and (2) the public transpor-
tation agencies"). The former category includes electricity and natural gas utilities as well as
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gree of public interest.5 Conflict inheres in the regulation of such in-
dustries, as "[t]he basic objective of private corporations is profit
maximization, while the public interest demands adequate service at
the lowest possible price."' 6 Thus, both the private corporations and
the public that relies on their services are left to lobby government for
either more or less regulation.7 But where competition amongst or
within industries can be relied on to protect the public interest, the
efficacy of a regulatory scheme is diminished. 8 The regulatory policy
debate, then, becomes 1) whether adequate competition exists within
or against a given industry such that the public interest is protected by
market forces alone, obviating the need for regulation, and 2) where
regulation is deemed necessary, what degree of regulation properly
balances the private interests with the public interest.9 The American
railroad industry has been steeped in this debate for the duration of its
existence; in fact, the health of the industry has consistently corre-
sponded to its level of regulation.10
The current regulatory policy debate in the freight railroading in-
dustry, or reregulation debate,"1 naturally features two opposing par-
ties: railroad companies and shippers.' 2  Simply put, railroad
companies oppose reregulation and shippers support it.13 Of course,
communication services. PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 4. The latter category includes airlines, bus
companies, motor freight carriers (trucks), barges, and railroads. Id.
5. PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 4 (asserting that the high degree of public interest attached to
such industries provides the primary legal basis for their regulation).
6. Id. at 5. The regulatory agency is charged with balancing these diametrically opposed goals.
See infra Part III.B.
7. PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 7 ("It is to be expected that the regulated industries favor mini-
mum regulation, while the public may demand the maximum.").
8. See supra text accompanying note 5.
9. As Professor Phillips points out, "[tihe fact that regulation is necessary does not imply how
much or what kind of regulation is desirable." PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 7.
10. This Comment focuses squarely on the freight transportation industry of the American
railroads. While discussion of some passenger transportation issues may be germane to the sub-
ject, those issues are intentionally excluded from this analysis.
11. "Reregulation" is the term often used to describe increased federal regulation of the rail-
road industry. While it may connote an absence of current regulation whatsoever, that is not the
case. See infra Part III. The author uses it here primarily for conformity's and brevity's sake,
noting, however, that it is a flexible rather than a static concept. In other words, there is not a
definite threshold where increased regulation turns into reregulation.
12. Included in these party labels are trade associations and interest groups: the Association
of American Railroads (AAR) and Consumers United for Rail Equity (CURE), for example.
13. Compare POLICY AND ECON. DEP'T, Assoc. OF AM. R.R., OVERVIEW OF R.R. REREGU-
LATION (2007), available at http://www.aar.org/GetFile.aspFileID=830, with CONSUMERS
UNITED FOR RAIL EQUITY ET AL., STMT. OF THE CAPTIVE RAIL CUSTOMER CMTY. IN SUPPORT
OF THE R.R. COMPETITION Acr OF 2005 (2005), available at http://www.railcure.org/pdf/
supportrca2005.pdf [hereinafter CURE STATEMENT].
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such an oversimplification beckons elucidation. 14 The origins of the
reregulation debate are largely historic: a looming remnant of the days
when the federal government heavily regulated the rail industry.15
During that ninety-three-year period, the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission ("ICC") promulgated maximum rate schedules for every
route on the nation's interstate rail system;16 the maximum rate that a
railroad company could charge for a shipment between any two cities
was capped at a set rate, regardless of the actual cost of the move-
ment. 17 Railroad companies were also required to serve shippers that
resided along their rail lines under their "common carrier obligation,"
even if doing so were inefficient and unprofitable. 18 Thus shippers had
a steady supply of rail transportation service at a relatively low rate. 19
However, because railroad companies were prevented from recouping
their costs of operation by the ICC rate ceilings, the health of the in-
dustry floundered and mass mergers and bankruptcies ensued.20 In re-
sponse, Congress passed the Staggers Act of 1980, which dissolved
much of the regulatory framework that had brought the rail industry
to its knees. 2' Particularly, the Staggers Act eliminated maximum rate
schedules and emphasized competition as the primary mechanism to
set railroad companies' freight shipment rates. 22 Those rates have
since been subject to market forces and confront shippers with the
possibility of higher rates and decreased availability of rail services.23
Shippers' response has been to call for reregulation, which at least two
commentators view as a transparent euphemism for lower rates. 24
14. I use the term "shippers" throughout the article in reference to shippers and shippers'
groups that support reregulation. In all fairness, some shippers, particularly large shippers that
have been able to negotiate favorable rates, ardently oppose reregulation.
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. G. Kent Woodman & Jane Sutter Starke, The Competitive Access Debate: A 'Backdoor'
Approach to Rate Regulation, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 263, 265 (1988) (stating that during that period
"[tihere were literally millions of different rates published and on file with the Commission").
17. Id.
18. Oren Harris, Introduction, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 18 (1962).
19. See id.
20. The most famous bankruptcy was the Penn Central Transportation Company bankruptcy
in 1969. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 337 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
21. Staggers Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980).
22. 49 U.S.C. § 10101(1) (2005).
23. Rates actually decreased twenty percent from 1985 to 2004. U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, FREIGHT RAILROADS: INDUSTRY HEALTH HAS IMPROVED, BUT CONCERNS ABOUT
COMPETITION AND CAPACITY SHOULD BE ADDRESSED 11-12 (2006) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT].
24. Woodman & Starke, supra note 16, at 273 (stating that "the ultimate goal of... reregula-
tion forces is to lower rail rates, and ... they are quite willing to engage in whatever statutory
contortions may be necessary regarding the competitive access provisions in order to achieve
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If lower rates are the desired end of shippers' calls for reregulation,
then the means of achieving that end in the post-Staggers era has been
to argue the absence of competition.25 Generally, shippers argue that
reregulation is needed to inject competition into markets served by
only one railroad company. 26 In those markets, shippers argue, rail-
road companies are able to charge exorbitant rates for rail transporta-
tion services, rates that shippers in those markets have little choice but
to pay.27 Shippers often refer to shippers served by only one railroad
company as "captive shippers," a rhetorical tactic that re-characterizes
the Staggers Act concept of "market dominance" in terms of the rail-
road industry alone, as opposed to the entire transportation indus-
try.28 Railroad companies, on the other hand, argue that competition
exists from other modes of transportation in markets served by only
one railroad company, and that where effective competition does not
exist, adequate safeguards are in place to protect shippers from mar-
ket abuse.29 Further, railroad companies argue that only recently have
they become able to make the kind of returns on investment that al-
low for reinvestment in the country's rail infrastructure, which is antic-
ipated to become inadequate in the next twenty years without
substantial expansion.30 Because shippers represent nearly every type
of company in the nation, from retail to energy to produce,31 the rer-
egulation debate holds real-world consequences for both the nation's
companies and consumers. For instance, increased regulation may re-
sult in lower rates for a time, which ultimately benefits consumers in
the form of lower prices, but those lower prices would likely sky-
rocket if the nation's rail infrastructure were supersaturated ten years
later because today's railroad companies were prevented from invest-
that end"). Reciprocal switching, terminal agreements, trackage rights, and bottleneck rate set-
ting are competitive access provisions discussed herein. See infra Part IV.B.1-4.
25. The Staggers Act contains avenues for redress, i.e. lower rates, where there is a lack of
competition in a given market. See infra Part III.B.1. By no means does the reregulation debate
solely focus on the rates that rail carriers charge shippers. Reregulation also includes entry into
the industry, exit out of the industry, abandonment, merger, and other areas concerning railroad
operation. Pertinent as those areas may be, this Comment focuses primarily on reregulation of
freight rates, which has been hotly debated as of late.
26. The various methods of injecting competition into the railroad industry are discussed infra
Part IV.B.1-4.
27. See generally CURE :: Consumers United For Rail Equity, http://www.railcure.org (last
visited Oct. 20, 2007).
28. See infra note 146 and Part V.A.
29. See infra Part V.
30. See infra Part V.C and note 185.
31. See CURE STATEMENT, supra note 13.
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ing in expanding rail capacity.32 Such supersaturation would shift a
larger market share of freight transportation services to trucking com-
panies, and thus result in more highway traffic. Yet, a greater market
share for trucking companies may result in better highways, as main-
taining interstate highways would rank higher as a national interest.
As soon becomes readily apparent, the issue of railroad regulation is
an important, yet difficult problem that will inevitably affect the coun-
try and its citizens in a very real way over the next twenty years. What
that effect will be is the subject of this Comment.
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part II provides the back-story
for the current issue: a brief history of railroad regulation, substantial
deregulation via the Staggers Act of 1980, and the establishment of
the Surface Transportation Board via the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission Termination Act of 1995. Part III explores in depth current
regulation of the railroad industry by the Surface Transportation
Board. Part IV discusses the movement for reregulation by shippers
and their proposals to inject competition into the railroad industry,
including legislation and lobbying efforts in Washington, D.C. Part V
addresses shippers' proposals and explains why reregulation is both
unnecessary and detrimental to the economic welfare of the nation.
Part VI concludes the Comment and summarizes the importance of
the railroad reregulation debate.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Federal Regulation of the Railroad Industry
The American railroad industry is deeply rooted in private owner-
ship.33 The first railroads in the United States were constructed and
operated entirely via private capital,34 and were unregulated by the
32. See PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that "a higher rate of return in the short run may
lead to lower rates or improved services in the long run").
33. PImLLIPS, supra note 2, at 442; William E. Thorns, Clear Track for Deregulation American
Railroads, 1970-1980, 12 TRANSP. L.J. 183, 185 (1982). See also Harris, supra note 18, at 3:
The earliest railroads were merely tramways operated by horse-power and stationary
engines, the use of locomotives not having begun until about 1831. It was assumed that
these railroads would be public highways, open to all users who had the proper rolling
stock and who paid the established highway tolls. Some of the earliest [rail]roads, in
fact, were operated for a time on the toll-road principle. However, this procedure soon
proved to be impractical because of the special type of equipment required and the
difficulty in meeting and passing other users of the road.
(internal citations omitted). The fact that the railroad industry must maintain the ways over
which its transportation moves provides the basis for differential pricing, discussed infra note
105.
34. Thorns, supra note 33, at 185 ("Although virtually all the railroads in the world were origi-
nally built with private capital, American railroads are unique in that they stayed in private
2007]
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federal government until Congress passed the Act to Regulate Com-
merce in 1887 ("1887 Act").35 Prior to the 1887 Act, regulation of the
railroad industry was carried out by the several states.36 The states
effected regulation of early railroad companies in a number of ways:
1) by granting corporate charters and authorizing railroad construc-
tion in the first instance,37 2) by assessing taxes and limiting profits (if
necessary),38 3) by passing legislation prescribing the manner and lo-
cation of railroad construction, 39 and 4) by requiring specific services
from the railroad companies once they were operational.40 Because
states' regulation was facially comprehensive during the early forma-
tion of the railroad industry, "[f]ederal intervention seemed not only
unnecessary but [also] intrusive unless State power should be abused;
and the abuse not often appearing, intervention was scarcely thought
of by anyone. ' 41 Thus, the several states retained sole, albeit scant,
regulatory power over the railroad industry during the first days of its
formation, hastening its growth with largely pro-railroad legislation.4 2
B. The Movement towards Federal Regulation
Soon, however, the railroad industry began to outgrow the rela-
tively mild regulation then asserted by the states.43 Because the states
did not have broad regulatory authority over the industry as a whole,
hands.... Elsewhere in the world, railroads are run by the state and are administered for public
or social benefits very much like highway departments.").
35. 24 Stat. 379 (1887). Congress passed the Act to Regulate Commerce largely in response to
Western rural sentiment that railroads had too much economic power that they systematically
abused. See generally SOLON JUSTUS BUCK, THE GRANGER MOVEMENT (1913). The Granger
movement, an affiliation of farmers created in order to mobilize collective economic and politi-
cal power shortly after the conclusion of the Civil War, lobbied successfully for passage of the
Act. Id. For an in-depth discussion of the Granger movement, see id.
36. Harris, supra note 18, at 2.
37. Id. at 6-7. Some charters included "clauses requiring the publication of rates, establish-
ment of maximum rates, filing of annual reports, and prohibiting discrimination." Id. at 6 (citing
STUART DAGGETT, PRINCIPLES OF INLAND TRANSPORTATION 609 (Rev. ed. 1934)).
38. Harris, supra note 18, at 2.
39. Id. at 2-3. However, "[s]ome states passed general railroad laws which permitted promot-
ers to build [raillroads anywhere they chose without having to obtain permission from the state
legislatures." Id.
40. See Thoms, supra note 33, at 186.
41. Harris, supra note 18, at 2 (citing 1 ICC Ann. Rep. 3 (1887)).
42. Id. at 4. See also PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 443. Phillips elaborates as follows:
It was during this early period of railroad development that the people generally
looked on the railroad as a great benefactor . . . and [ ] actively supported the new
method of transportation. Local units of government bought railroad stocks and bonds,
made direct loans, and gave station sites and exempted some property from taxation to
encourage railroads to locate in their towns.
Id. at 443-44.
43. Harris, supra note 18, at 3-4.
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most standards concerning the operation of the railroads were devel-
oped by the railroad companies themselves. 4  When states later
passed legislation seeking to reign in perceived abuse in the industry, 45
railroad companies challenged the legislation on Dormant Commerce
Clause grounds. 46 The United States Supreme Court upheld instances
of state regulation in Munn v. Illinois;4 7 Chicago, Burlington, &
Quincy Railroad Co. v. Iowa;48 Peik v. Chicago & North-Western Rail-
way Co.;49 Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railroad Co. v. Ackley;50
Winona & St. Peter Railroad Co. v. Blake;51 and Stone v. Wisconsin52
(collectively known as the Granger cases), and indicated in each case
that "[u]ntil Congress acts in reference to the relations of [the rail-
road] company to interstate commerce, it is certainly within the power
of [the state] to regulate its fares, etc., so far as they are of domestic
concern. '53 The underlying debate in the Granger cases was between
western farmers and the railroad companies concerning the reasona-
bleness of shipping rates;54 the farmers blamed exorbitant rail rates
for their inability to profit on crops, while the railroad companies in-
sisted that such rates were necessary in order to keep the railroad in-
dustry up and running.5 5 The Court's emphasis on the paucity of
Congressional action, obsequiously noted in the Granger cases, con-
tributed to the impetus in Washington for regulatory legislation. The
Court eventually did an about-face and made its stance in the regula-
tion debate crystal clear by invalidating state regulatory legislation on
Dormant Commerce Clause grounds in Wabash, St. Louis, & Penn-
Railway line mileage increased three-fold in each succeeding decade from 1840 when
we had 2,800 miles of track until 1860 and nearly doubled in each decade from 1860
until 1890. In the latter year the expanse of track reached 163,000 miles, and the rail
network stretched from coast to coast and reached into every state of the nation.
Id.
44. Id. at 4. See also PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 444 (explaining that although many of the state-
granted charters contained maximum rate schedules and restrictions on discriminatory rates,
such provisions were not often enforced).
45. See Robert M. Hardaway, Transportation Deregulation (1976-1984): Turning the Tide, 14
TRANSP. L.J. 101, 115 (1985).
46. Id. at 114 n.58. See, e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S.
418 (1870); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518 (1851).
47. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
48. 94 U.S. 155 (1876).
49. 94 U.S. 164 (1876).
50. 94 U.S. 179 (1876).
51. 94 U.S. 180 (1876).
52. 94 U.S. 181 (1876).
53. Peik, 94 U.S. at 178.
54. Harris, supra note 18, at 6.
55. Indeed, these are the same arguments being made today. In 140 years, the argument has
changed little, which is a testament to the earnestness on each side of the debate.
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sylvania Railway Co. v. Illinois;56 decided a year before Congress es-
tablished the first independent regulatory agency via the 1887 Act.5 7
C. Federal Regulation of the Railroad Industry: The Act to
Regulate Commerce of 1887
The 1887 Act, inter alia, created the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, which was vested with broad regulatory jurisdiction over the rail-
road industry. 58 The ICC's initial functions included general oversight
of railroad management, collecting and analyzing annual reports from
railroad companies as mandated by the 1887 Act, hearing complaints
of unlawful practices and formulating remedies, and enforcing the
1887 Act's requirement that all rates be just and reasonable. 59 While
the last requirement may seem like a protective measure for the sole
benefit of shippers, at least one commentator insists that railroad com-
panies welcomed the rate regulation. 60 Subsequent legislation reme-
died both substantive and procedural flaws in the 1887 Act,61 and by
the early 1910s the ICC exercised dominant control over the railroad
industry, especially in the realm of rate regulation.62 The ICC promul-
gated maximum rates for rail routes while at the same time restricting
pooling of freight, "a means by which the railroads might have coop-
erated in securing shipment by the shortest and cheapest route"; the
ICC thus prevented railroad companies from operating efficiently and
competitively. 63 Over the next seventy years, the ICC's regulation of
the railroad industry stifled competition not only in the railroad indus-
try itself, but also impaired the railroad industry's ability to compete
56. 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
57. Harris, supra note 18, at 1.
58. Id. at 16.
59. Id.
60. See Hardaway, supra note 45, at 114 n.58 (citing a handful of works chronicling railroad
support of regulation). Generally, the argument that railroads supported regulation is premised
on the fact that unregulated competition both within the railroad industry (rate wars) and
against other modes of transportation had driven rates so low that federal regulation was needed
to establish a higher minimum rate for the railroad industry. Thus, while "just and reasonable"
may conjure up images of poor farmers being steamrolled by exorbitant rail rates and a bur-
geoning railroad industry, it can also be viewed from the other side of the track: that the expen-
sive operation of railroads could not persist without either federal regulation or subsidy. See id.
at 113-15.
61. Thoms, supra note 33, at 190 (citing R. SAUNDERS, THE RAILROAD MERGERS AND THE
COMING OF CONRAIL 34 (1978)). This legislation included the Hepburn Act of 1906 and the
Mann-Elkins Act of 1910. SAUNDERS at 34.
62. SAUNDERS, supra note 61, at 34. "The ICC flexed its new muscles over rate-making by
denying the railroads' request for general rate increases in 1911 and again in 1912." Id.
63. PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 452. The result was a dramatic decrease in the quality of service,
and ultimately an inability to serve the nation during wartime. See infra note 65. Such a combina-
tion of rate regulation and practice regulation would have a similar result even today.
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with other transportation industries.64 By the time the United States
entered World War I in 1917, the railroad industry was so beleaguered
by ICC regulation that President Wilson deemed it necessary to na-
tionalize the nation's railroads in order to meet the demands of war-
time. 65 The health of the railroad industry was so poor as the result of
overregulation that the number of railroad companies had decreased
from 1,564 in 1907 to seven major carriers accounting for eighty-five
percent of all rail traffic in 1980.66 The heavy-handed regulation of the
ICC set the stage for drastic regulatory refurbishment between 1970
and 1980.67
D. The Movement towards Deregulation of the Railroad Industry
Although the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 has been regarded
as the first deregulatory piece of legislation,68 it did little to remedy
the dismal effects of regulation.69 Not until Congress passed the Rail-
road Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 197670 ("4R Act")
and the Staggers Rail Act of 198071 ("Staggers Act") was the railroad
industry somewhat relieved of the regulatory load it had been shoul-
dering for the better part of a century. The 4R Act did not go so far as
to abolish the ICC's regulatory scheme altogether, but did loosen the
reins.72 The most important contributions of the 4R Act, primarily be-
64. Thorns, supra note 33, at 185 n.7 (stating that "[bletween 1947 and 1977, rail's share of the
total transportation revenue dropped from 70% to 30%" (citing statement of William H. Demp-
sey, President, Association of American Railroads on Hearings Before Sub. on Transportation
and Commerce of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
5 (1979))). The unregulated motor carriers could "vary their rates in order to accommodate
swiftly changing market conditions but railroads could not." Hardaway, supra note 45, at 151
n.68. Thus the railroads were handcuffed from obviating the devastating effects of regulation on
its industry. See Winston, The Welfare Effects of ICC Rate Regulation Revisited, 12 BELL J.
ECON. 232, 233 (1981).
65. PHILLIPs, supra note 2, at 453 ("On December 28, 1917, by proclamation of President
Wilson, the federal government took over the nation's railroads. They were operated during the
war period by the United States Railroad Administration.").
66. Hardaway, supra note 45, at 118. The term "carrier" is used herein as a synonym for
railroad company.
67. See, e.g., Hilton, What Went Wrong and What to do About It: The ICC Must Go, TRAINS,
Jan. 1967, at 37. See also Hardaway, supra note 45, at 121-25 (listing nine negative effects of the
ICC's regulation).
68. Thoms, supra note 33, at 198.
69. Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1327 (1970). See Hard-
away, supra note 45, at 125 (referring to the Act as a "euthanasia scheme").
70. Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (1976).
71. Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980).
72. Hardaway, supra note 45, at 125. The 4R Act "did not change the fundamental nature of
regulation, [but] it did make some changes in the regulatory system: minimum and maximum
rate regulation, establishment of demand sensitive (seasonal) rates, separate rates for distinct
rail services, operations of rate bureaus, merger, abandonment procedures and accounting and
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cause of their role in the subsequent Staggers Act, were the concepts
of market dominance 73 and demand sensitive pricing.74 While the 4R
Act was intended to "'inaugurate a new era of competitive pricing,"'
railroad companies failed to take up the competitive ratemaking call,
instead relying on general rate increases for revenue as they had in the
past.75 The 4R Act was a step in the right direction, but it soon be-
came apparent that its provisions did not go far enough in relaxing the
regulatory framework. 76 Its remedy came in 1980, only four years
later, in the form of the Staggers Act.77
E. Substantial Deregulation of the Railroads:
The Staggers Act of 1980
The Staggers Act 78 is the most far-reaching piece of deregulatory
legislation the railroad industry has seen; however, contrary to popu-
lar verbiage, it did not completely deregulate the railroad industry.79
The Staggers Act instead "created a new declaration of regulation pol-
icy which stressed competition to the maximum extent possible." 80
Specifically, the Staggers Act enabled railroad companies to 1) inde-
pendently negotiate rates with shippers that would then be memorial-
ized in private contracts not subject to ICC scrutiny,81 2) more easily
costing methods." Thorns, supra note 33, at 207 (citing DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, A PROSPEC-
TUS FOR CHANGE IN THE FREIGHT RAILROAD INDUSTRY 114 (1978)).
73. Market dominance was the threshold requirement for challenging the reasonableness of a
rate under the 4R Act. In order to successfully petition the ICC to find a rail carrier's rate as
unreasonable, a shipper had to first show that there was a lack of competition from other carriers
or modes for that particular shipment. Only if a rail carrier dominated the market could a rate be
found unreasonable. Thoms, supra note 33, at 208. See also infra Part III.B.1. For a great discus-
sion of the concept, see Norman H. Jones, Jr., The Meaning of Market Dominance, in RAILROAD
REVITALIZATION AND REGULATORY REFORM 203 (Paul W. MacAvoy & John W. Snow eds.,
1977).
74. Demand sensitive pricing, which enabled railroads to charge different rates for seasonal
demand, was the prologue to the concept of differential pricing established by the Staggers Act.
See infra note 105 (discussing differential pricing).
75. Thorns, supra note 33, at 208.
76. Id.
77. Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980).
78. The Staggers Act is believed to be the first legislation to be officially named after its
introducer. Staggers Rail Act, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Staggers-RailAct (last visited Sept.
10, 2007).
79. See Frank N. Wilner, Is Deregulation Really Reregulation?, TRAINS, Jan. 1980, at 22-25.
80. Thorns, supra note 33, at 212. See also 49 U.S.C. § 10101(a) (1982) (stating, inter alia, that
rail transportation policy included allowing competition to establish reasonable rates, minimizing
federal regulatory control over the rail industry, and enabling rail carriers to earn adequate
revenues).
81. 49 U.S.C. § 10713 (1982). See generally Hyman Hillenbrand, Contracting Under the Stag-
gers Act, 18 FORUM 1 (1982).
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abandon track in order to improve system-wide efficiency,82 and 3)
adjust rates in a shorter period of time in response to fluctuations in
the market. 83 The Staggers Act also codified the concept of demand-
based differential pricing,84 while concomitantly emphasizing the need
to balance the interests of the railroad industry in pursuing adequate
revenues with the interests of shippers in paying reasonable rates for
railroad services.85
F. A Changing of the Guard: The Surface Transportation
Board Replaces the ICC
Finally, the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of
1995 ("ICCTA") completed the regulatory policy that the federal gov-
ernment espouses today by replacing the ICC with the Surface Trans-
portation Board ("STB"); 86 the ICCTA eliminated some of the ICC's
duties under the Staggers Act, transferring those remaining to the
STB.87 The STB is now the primary regulatory agency with economic
oversight over the railroad industry, thus far a stark contrast to the
ICC's legacy of inefficient, debilitating regulation.88
III. CURRENT RAILROAD REGULATION
A. The Surface Transportation Board
Together, the Staggers Act and ICCTA provide the basis for the
federal government's regulation of the railroad industry today.89 The
STB, an independent regulatory agency under the Department of
Transportation, is the primary means by which the policies set forth in
the Staggers Act and ICCTA are carried out.90 While the Staggers Act
and ICCTA plainly emphasize that competition is preferred as the
82. Thorns, supra note 33, at 213.
83. Hardaway, supra note 45, at 126.
84. § 10707. See infra note 105 (discussing differential pricing).
85. GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 4; § 10101(1), (3).
86. Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995).
87. For a comparison of retained functions to those eliminated, see the STB website and pdfs
thereat, available at http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/public/resourcesjicc.html.
88. The consensus among economists is that the ICC's heavy-handed regulation was responsi-
ble for the railroad industry's plight during its tenure. One study estimates regulation resource
misallocation by the ICC resulted in losses of three billion dollars annually. G. M. Davis, Surface
Transportation Regulation-A Succinct Analysis, 47 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 55, 62 (1979).
89. See 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (2005).
90. The Department of Transportation is also in the process of memorializing a formal Na-
tional Freight Transportation Policy. See DEP'T OF TRANSP., NATIONAL FREIGHT TRANSPORTA-
TION POLICY STATEMENT (2003), available at http://ostpxweb.ost.dot.gov/policy/Data/National%
20Freight%20Transportation%2OPolicy%2OStatement.pdf.
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mechanism for maintaining the balance between railroad companies'
and shippers' needs, 91 the STB has the authority to
[1] adjudicate rate cases to resolve disputes between captive shippers
and railroads upon receiving a complaint from a shipper; [2] ap-
prove rail transactions, such as mergers, consolidations, acquisitions,
and trackage rights; [3] prescribe new regulations, such as rules for
competitive access and merger approvals; and [4] inquire into and
report on rail industry practices, including obtaining information
from railroads on its own initiative and holding hearings to inquire
into areas of concern, such as competition. 92
The STB has been most visibly active in asserting not only its adjudi-
cative power regarding rate challenge cases, but its prescriptive power
in promulgating rules and standards governing those challenges as
well.93
B. The STB's Adjudicative Power: Rate Challenge Cases
Rate-challenge cases confront the STB with implementing its most
polarizing charge: ensuring both the reasonableness of rates and rail-
road companies' opportunity to earn adequate revenue.94 A rate chal-
lenge case commences when a shipper files a complaint with the STB
alleging that a railroad company is charging it an exorbitant rate, a
claim which the railroad forthrightly refutes. 95 Thus, the STB is caught
in the middle of shippers and railroad companies, each side contesting
that the STB has a duty to protect it.96 The rub for the STB is that
both sides are right; nevertheless, the STB must balance the respective
needs of each side, all the while considering the public interest in the
matter. 97
1. The STB's Duty to Protect Shippers
The STB's duty to protect shippers from unreasonable rates
harkens back to the creation of the ICC in 1887.98 The concept and
parlance of a "captive shipper," first adopted in the mid-nineteenth
century,99 correlates to the concept of "market dominance" codified
91. § 10101(1), (3).
92. GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 38. This list is by no means exhaustive.
93. See infra Part III.B-C.
94. Compare § 10101(1) with § 10101(3).
95. GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 39.
96. See supra note 94.
97. 49 U.S.C. § 10705(a)(1) (2005).
98. See supra Part II.C.
99. P. V. Garrod & W. Miklius, "Captive Shippers" and the Success of Railroads in Capturing
Monopoly Rent, 30 J. L. & ECON. 423, 423 (1987).
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in Section 202 of the Staggers Act.100 In order to challenge the reason-
ableness of a rate, a shipper must first establish that it is a captive
shipper: that the rail carrier charging the contested rate has market
dominance.10' "'Market dominance' means an absence of effective
competition from other rail carriers or modes of transportation for the
transportation to which a rate applies"; 102 in other words, a shipper is
captive if no effective competition exists in the transportation market
to ship its product. In such a situation, the shipper, hampered in the
negotiation process as it may be by its lack of bargaining power, has
little choice but to accept the rate it negotiates with a railroad com-
pany. 103 Once a shipper establishes its captivity, it can then challenge
the reasonableness of the rate. 10 4 A rate is reasonable as a matter of
law if it is less than 180% of the railroad company's variable cost of
moving the shipment. 0 5 If a rate is equal to or more than 180% of the
railroad company's variable cost of the shipment, the STB may con-
clude upon investigation and hearing that the rate is unreasonable and
order the railroad company to pay reparations to the shipper.10 6 Al-
though shippers have often been successful challenging rates, the cost
prohibitiveness of waging such challenges has, until recently, left many
shippers feeling as though they had no adequate avenue for redress. 0 7
100. § 10707.
101. Major Issues in Rate Cases, STB Ex Parte No. 657 (Sub-No. 1), 2006 WL 3087168, at *4
(S.T.B. Oct. 30, 2006). If a shipper is not captive, i.e. where market dominance does not exist, the
rate is unchallengeable. Id.
102. § 10707(a).
103. See generally David Barnes, Horror Stories, TRAFFIC WORLD, Dec. 15, 1997, at 13.
104. 49 U.S.C. § 10707(c) (2005).
105. § 10707(d)(1)(A). The pricing framework in the railroad industry is unique in that much
of railroads' overhead expenses are fixed and not attributable to any given shipment. Indeed,
railroads incur such costs irrespective of whether there is a demand for shipping services or not.
One example of these "common costs" is rail maintenance; rails have to be maintained at the
same high level regardless of whether ten or one hundred trains pass over them in a given
month. Thus, railroad rates are (typically) propounded in two sections: variable and common.
Variable costs are the costs that can be attributed to a specific shipment, such as the salaries of
the crew on a particular shipment, while common costs are a portion of the railroad's system-
wide common costs. The concept of differential pricing allows railroads to allocate common costs
among shippers in an unequal fashion in order to ensure that their common costs are adequately
recouped. Thus, a shipper that has less alternatives for transporting its product is assessed a
greater portion of a railroad's common costs; because the shipper depends more on rail transpor-
tation, railroads are justified in collecting a higher percentage of common costs from it. If a
railroad tried to recoup the same portion of common costs from a shipper that had more trans-
portation alternatives, it might not be able to get that shipper's business at all. See GAO RE.
PORT, supra note 23, at 7-8.
106. § 11704(b).
107. The STB has recently simplified the guidelines for resolving large shipment rate disputes.
See Major Issues in Rate Cases, STB Ex Parte No. 657 (Sub-No. 1), 2006 WL 3087168 (S.T.B.
Oct. 30, 2006). Likewise, the STB has also simplified the guidelines for resolving small- and
medium-sized shipment rate disputes. See Simplified Standards for Rail Rate Cases, STB Ex
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2. The STB's Duty to Protect Railroad Companies
The STB's duty to protect railroad companies involves ensuring
that "rail carriers" have the opportunity to earn "adequate reve-
nues."'10 8 Central to that end is the concept of differential pricing.10 9
Because railroad transportation differs from other modes of transpor-
tation in that railroad companies must maintain the routes over which
their transportation moves, railroad companies must collect from their
patrons the common costs of ownership and maintenance not attribu-
table to any given shipment. 10 Differential pricing enables railroad
companies to collect a greater portion of their common costs from the
shippers that depend on rail transportation the most; this in turn sus-
tains the railroad industry in the long run, as the industry can rely
more heavily on the business from its steady customers."1 The STB
fulfills its duty of protecting the long-term sustainability of the rail-
road industry and, in turn, carriers' opportunity to earn "adequate
revenues" by excluding from the rate-reasonableness evaluation
threshold railroad companies' common costs; instead, the threshold
for considering the reasonableness of a rate is calculated only in terms
of variable costs. 112 The STB also takes affirmative steps to protect
railroads by determining revenue adequacy outside the framework of
rate challenges."l 3 "STB determines the revenue adequacy of a rail-
road by comparing the railroad's return on investment with the indus-
trywide cost of capital .... [I]f a railroad's return on investment is
greater than the industrywide cost of capital, STB determines that
railroad to be revenue adequate. 1 1 4
3. The Public Interest
Along with considering railroad companies' and shippers' interests
in a rate challenge case, the STB must factor into its decision a third
Parte No. 646 (Sub-No. 1), 2007 WL 2493509 (S.T.B. Sept. 4, 2007). These simplified guidelines
reduced the costs for shippers to challenge rates and for railroad companies to defend them. See
infra Part III.C.1.
108. § 10701(d)(2).
109. See supra text accompanying note 105.
110. Contrarily, trucks rely on tax dollars for the maintenance of highways and barges need
only follow the current.
111. See supra text accompanying note 105.
112. 49 U.S.C. § 10707(d)(1)(A) (2005). See also supra text accompanying note 105.
113. GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 7.
114. Id. "Adequate revenues are defined as those that are sufficient - under honest, economi-
cal, and efficient management - to cover operating expenses, support prudent capital outlays,
repay a reasonable debt level, raise needed equity capital, and otherwise attract and retain capi-
tal amounts adequate to provide a sound rail transportation system." Major Issues in Rate
Cases, STB Ex Parte No. 657 (Sub-No. 1), 2006 WL 3087168 (S.T.B. Oct. 30, 2006).
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calculus: the public interest. 15 This nebulous charge reinforces the no-
tion that the public interest attached to the railroad industry provides
the primary justification for its regulation. 116 Although it may seem
that "considering the public interest" merely restates the STB's duty
to weigh shippers' interests against railroad companies' interests (that
the public interest is necessarily accounted for in the STB's rate-chal-
lenge formula),11 7 the phrase injects a rather crucial substantive factor
into the STB's rate reasonableness analysis.11 8 The STB must weigh in
its determination of the challenged rate's reasonableness whether the
rate is the result of market abuse or sound economic practice.11 9 Such
determination derives only from a relative policy judgment between
two alternatives: either the rate is permissibly high because the rail-
road must charge that amount in order to sustain itself economically
(reasonable economic practice), or the rate is impermissibly high be-
cause the shipper has no alternative shipping option and has little
choice but to pay the inflated rate, notwithstanding the fact that cur-
rent rate relief may lead to poor service in the future (market abuse).
Thus, at bottom, the STB is weighing the relative desirability of long-
term economic benefits, say lower future rates and improved service,
versus short-term economic benefits for the shipper, to determine rea-
sonableness.120 This somewhat result-oriented analysis shows the
overlapping of the STB's prescriptive and adjudicative roles.
C. The STB's Prescriptive Power
Unlike its adjudicative power, the STB can exercise its prescriptive
power upon its own initiative-it need not wait until some sort of
complaint is filed. 121 Therefore, the STB's prescriptive power is poten-
tially the most far-reaching of its powers.1 22 Typically, the STB an-
nounces a proposed ruling, fields comments from interested parties
115. 49 U.S.C. § 10705(a)(1) (2005).
116. See supra note 5.
117. See supra Part III.B.1.
118. § 10705(a)(1); see also BNSF R.R. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 453 F.3d 473, 485 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (noting that the "Board 'is not the prisoner of the parties' submissions' but rather has
a duty 'to weigh alternatives and make its choice according to its judgment how best to achieve
and advance the goals of the National Transportation Policy"' (quoting Balt. & Ohio R.R. v.
United States, 386 U.S. 372, 430 (1967) (Brennan, J., conc.))).
119. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 43. Recall that even a rate greater than 180% of a
railroad's variable cost of a movement can still be reasonable. The 180% of variable cost mark is
merely the threshold for entering the reasonableness determination. See supra Part III.B.1.
120. See PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing long-term versus short-term economic
benefits).
121. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 39.
122. Through its prescriptive power, the STB is able to regulate railroad practices sua sponte.
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regarding those rulings, and then issues an ex parte decision. 123 While
these proceedings are not formally adversarial, they often concern the
administration of the STB's adjudicative power and thus offer another
forum for railroad companies and shippers to advocate their interests.
The STB stretched its prescriptive legs this past year by reforming the
rate challenge evaluation method in small- and medium-sized ship-
ment rate disputes 24 and large shipment rate dispute cases.125
1. Rate Reasonableness Evaluation Methods: STB Ex Parte
No. 657 and STB Ex Parte No. 646
In 2006, the STB addressed both shippers' and railroad companies'
concerns that the rate challenge process had become overly complex
and cost prohibitive by seeking comments on proposed changes to its
rate challenge evaluation method. 126 Particularly, the STB stated that
"there [had] been major issues in large rail rate cases that were being
litigated again and again, with the parties in individual cases unable to
develop acceptable solutions to problems that they had identified with
the existing approach.' 27 The STB subsequently issued STB Ex Parte
No. 657, the first of two rulings to make the rate challenge evaluation
method less complex and less costly.' 2 8 STB Ex Parte No. 657 adjusts
the methodology of analyzing the "stand-alone cost" of a shippers'
movement, which seeks to determine whether a challenged rate im-
properly includes costs from which the shipper derives no benefit. 2 9
By limiting the types of evidence and arguments presentable in large
shipment rate challenge proceedings, STB Ex Parte No. 657 lowers the
overall cost of the rate challenge process, thereby enabling shippers to
bring lower value claims and seek meaningful relief where market
abuse has occurred. 130 The STB next issued STB Ex Parte No. 646, a
ruling in which the STB sought "to make its rail rate dispute resolu-
tion procedures more affordable and accessible to shippers of small
123. See, e.g., Simplified Standards for Rail Rate Cases, STB Ex Parte No. 646 (Sub-No. 1),
2007 WL 2493509, at *2 (S.T.B. Sept. 4, 2007) ("The Board heard the views of rail shippers,
railroads, rail labor, state governments, and other parts of the federal government.").
124. Id.
125. Major Issues in Rate Cases, STB Ex Parte No. 657 (Sub-No. 1), 2006 WL 3087168 (S.T.B.
Oct. 30, 2006). The STB also addresses practices tangential to rate challenge cases, such as fuel
surcharge practices. See Rail Fuel Surcharges, STB Ex Parte No. 661 (Sub-No. 1), 2007 WL
201205 (S.T.B. Jan. 25, 2007).
126. STB Ex Parte No. 657, 2006 WL 3087168, at *2; STB Ex Parte No. 646, 2007 WL 2493509,
at *2.
127. STB Ex Parte No. 657, 2006 WL 3087168, at *1.
128. Id.
129. Id. at *6.
130. Id. at *4.
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and medium-size shipments, while simultaneously ensuring that the
new guidelines do not result in arbitrary ratemaking.' 131 In that rul-
ing, the STB clearly acknowledged its role as the arbiter of shippers',
railroads', and the public's interests:
The Board concluded that significant changes to Simplified Guide-
lines were necessary to achieve the dual statutory goals of providing
captive shippers meaningful access to regulatory remedies for rail
rates that are unreasonable, while recognizing the need for railroads
to earn a reasonable return on their investments so that they will
have the resources to make the investment needed to continue to
serve the transportation needs of their customers. 132
STB Ex Parte No. 646 makes available to shippers challenging small-
and medium-sized shipment rates both a "simplified-stand-alone cost"
evaluation method and a "Three-Benchmark" evaluation method. 33
Thus the STB has reduced the cost of bringing rate challenges, while,
at the same time, increasing shippers' avenues for proving that market
abuse has occurred. 134
D. Deregulation: So Far, So Good
The effect of the Staggers Act and the ICCTA has been overwhelm-
ingly positive. 135 As the latest United States Government Accounta-
bility Office Report on the health of freight railroads notes, "[t]he
freight railroad industry's financial health improved substantially as
railroads cut costs through productivity improvements; streamlined
and right-sized their rail networks; implemented new technologies;
and expanded business into new markets, such as the intermodal mar-
ket. ' 136 As the health of the industry has improved,137 the level of
federal regulation seems to have effected an equilibrium of sorts: rail-
road companies are able to earn near-adequate revenues from rates
established through competition,1 38 and captive shippers have a more
effective avenue of redress to challenge what they deem to be exorbi-
tant rates. 139 Record income in the railroad industry has also enabled
131. STB Ex Parte No. 646, 2007 WL 2493509, at *2.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *3 (permitting shippers to choose under which method they wage their rate
challenge).
134. See id.
135. GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 9 ("There is a widespread consensus that the freight rail
industry has benefited from the Staggers Rail Act.").
136. Id. at 3.
137. Id. at 9-10.
138. See id. at 52 (noting that in 2004 the STB determined that one railroad was revenue
adequate and that others were approaching revenue adequacy).
139. See supra Part III.C.1.
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the railroads to invest $375 billion in infrastructure, which benefits
shippers through higher quality and more efficient service.140 Al-
though not all of the industry's problems have been solved, 14 1 the
problems that remain do not lend themselves to solution via increased
regulation without collateral detriment to both shippers and rail-
roads. 142 But many shippers remain dissatisfied with the level of regu-
lation in the railroad industry, some even calling for the elimination of
the STB altogether. 143
IV. THE MOVEMENT FOR REREGULATION
Although the health of the railroad industry has substantially im-
proved since the passage of the Staggers Act, some shippers support
increased regulation of the railroads, often referred to as "reregula-
tion.' 1 44 Shippers support reregulation for a variety of reasons, but
their common complaint is that without forced competition within the
railroad industry, shippers that have access to only one railroad are
being forced to pay exorbitant rates without any realistic alternative: a
veritable Hobson's choice. 145 These shippers often refer to themselves
as "captive shippers," even though the STB may not yet have deter-
mined the railroad that serves the shipper to have market domi-
nance.146 Forced competition within the railroad industry, they argue,
will benefit shippers through lower rates. 147 In order to inject competi-
tion into the industry, shippers propose a variety of solutions. 148
140. POLICY AND ECON. DEP'T, Assoc. OF AM. R.R., OVERVIEW OF R.R. REREGULATION
(2007), available at http://www.aar.org/GetFile.asp?FileID=830.
141. See infra Part V.D.
142. See infra Part V.D.
143. See generally Curtis Grimm & Cliff Winston, Competition in the Deregulated Railroad
Industry: Sources, Effects, and Policy Issues, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES:
WHAT'S NEXT? 41 (2000) (proposing Department of Justice oversight of market abuse and com-
plete deregulation).
144. See supra note 11.
145. They argue, thus, that other modes of transportation are not a realistic alternative.
146. This is the same terminology that the STB uses once it has found that a railroad has
market dominance in rate challenge cases. Major Issues in Rate Cases, STB Ex Parte No. 657
(Sub-No. 1), 2006 WL 3087168, at *4 (S.T.B. Oct. 30, 2006). Thus shippers use a clever rhetorical
device to characterize themselves as market dominated without the STB having made that deter-
mination. But see GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 3 ("It is difficult to determine precisely how
many shippers are captive because available proxy measures can overstate or understate
captivity.").
147. See PHILLIPS, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing long-term versus short-term economic
benefits).
148. See infra Part IV.B.1-4. These solutions are often collectively referred to as "competitive
access." Woodman & Starke, supra note 16, at 270.
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A. The Bane of Shippers' Existence: High Rates
Due to a Lack of Competition
At a glance, shippers' self-characterization as "captive" appears to
stem only from their desire to have lower rates, which, in and of itself,
is an integral motive to the proper functioning of the market.149 How-
ever, shippers' cries of captivity encompass more than rational eco-
nomic dissatisfaction with high rates; their grievance is that there is a
lack of competition within their market, and thus that the market is
flawed. Without competition, the market forces of supply and demand
do not protect shippers from not only high, but also unfair, exorbitant
rates. Shippers in such markets, therefore, are unprotected from eco-
nomic abuse by railroad companies-they lack any structural protec-
tion ordinarily provided by a properly functioning market. What
results are rates sometimes seventy-five percent higher than rates in a
competitive market. 150 Shippers' proposals are aimed at injecting
competition into the railroad industry not only to pull down rates, but
also to impose structural protection from economic abuse through a
properly functioning market.
B. Shippers' Proposals
Shippers propose a number of regulatory measures that, they argue,
would inject meaningful competition into the railroad industry. 15'
While many of their proposals are already in practice pursuant to indi-
vidual service contracts in the rail transportation industry, shippers ar-
gue that the STB should mandate that railroad companies adopt and
implement each measure described below.' 52
1. Reciprocal Switching
Reciprocal switching requires one railroad company to transport
the cars of another railroad company over the first railroad company's
tracks for a fee, usually within a terminal area, thereby enabling a
shipper located along one railroad company's line to access a second
railroad company's services. 153 To illustrate, Shipper, located along-
149. Such is necessary for the optimal utility of resources in a market economy. Hardaway,
supra note 45, at 108-09.
150. CURE :: Consumers United For Rail Equity, http://www.railcure.org/issue-faqs.htm#
competitive (last visited on Oct. 21, 2007).
151. Aside from the practice regulations listed herein, shippers also argue that making the
rate relief process more efficient would inject competition into the railroad industry. GAO RE-
PORT, supra note 23, at 43-44.
152. GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 44.
153. Id.
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side Railroad Company A's tracks, would have access to Railroad
Company B's services if A were mandated to move B's cars onto A's
tracks. This would give Shipper two rail shipping options and would
inject competition into the railroad industry.
2. Terminal Agreements
Terminal agreements require one railroad company to grant access
to terminal facilities on its rail line to another railroad company,
thereby enabling the second railroad company to travel over the first
railroad company's tracks in order to reach and use the first railroad
company's terminal facilities. 154 To illustrate, Shipper with access to
both Railroad Company A and Railroad Company B wants to ship its
product to Town X, in which only Railroad Company B has a rail
yard. Because Railroad Company A does not have a rail yard in Town
X, Shipper cannot ordinarily use Railroad Company A's services to
ship its product to Town X. However, if a mandatory terminal agree-
ment existed, Railroad Company B would be required to allow Rail-
road Company A to access Railroad Company B's terminal rail yard
in Town X, thereby allowing Shipper to choose to ship its products
with either Railroad Company A or B. A mandatory terminal agree-
ment would require that A have access to B's facilities and, therefore,
would inject rail competition into Shipper's market.
3. Trackage Rights
Trackage rights require one railroad company to permit another
railroad company to operate over the first railroad company's
tracks. 155 Therefore, Railroad Company A could travel over Railroad
Company B's tracks and vice versa. Open access to rail infrastructure
would give a shipper numerous options, thus injecting competition
into the rail industry.
4. Bottleneck Rate Setting
Bottleneck rate setting requires railroad companies to set rates for
portions of a route where only one railroad has track between two
given points. 156 For instance, a shipper may have access to two rail-
road companies both at the point of origin of a shipment and at its
final destination, but only one of those-railroad companies has track
along a portion of the route. Requiring that railroad company to es-
154. Id. at 45-46.
155. Id. at 45-47.
156. Id. at 48-50.
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tablish and disclose a rate for that portion of the shipment, along with
granting the other railroad trackage rights, would give the shipper
complete access to two railroad companies and inject competition into
the railroad industry.
C. Shippers' Efforts on the Hill: Lobbying and Legislation
Shippers' calls for competitive access have been rebuffed by the
STB repeatedly, with the STB stating that "competitive access raises
basic policy questions that are more appropriately resolved by Con-
gress.1 57 The STB's advice did not fall on deaf ears. Legislation has
been introduced in each Congress since the STB stated its deference
to the legislative branch, most recently in the 110th Congress via the
Railroad Competition and Service Improvement Act of 2007.158 Previ-
ous legislation died in committee in the 109th Congress and Senator
Dorgan of North Dakota vehemently vowed to reintroduce similar
legislation in the Democratic-controlled 110th Congress, which may
prove to be a friendlier landscape for shippers' interests. He stated
that "[t]he railroads have a pretty good thing going. They have mo-
nopoly power in their industry and the Surface Transportation Board,
which was supposedly created to protect rail customers, instead seems
to be more concerned with making sure the railroads don't have to
compete with one another."'1 59 Shippers' have also lobbied for legisla-
tion that would remove railroads' exemption from antitrust laws, most
recently via the Railroad Antitrust Enforcement Act of 2007.160 Ship-
pers' reregulation efforts in Washington, in one form or another, all
seek a common end: imposing mandatory intra-industry competition
on the nation's railroads.
V. INCREASED REGULATION Is NOT THE ANSWER
Shippers' calls for reregulation are misguided. Contrary to shippers'
rhetoric, shippers in markets that are served by only one railroad are
157. GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 41.
158. S. 953, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2125 110th Cong. (2007). This piece of pending legisla-
tion memorializes shippers' proposals for competitive access. The Railroad Competition and
Service Improvement Act of 2007, if passed in its current form, would require a railroad com-
pany, upon shipper request, to establish a rate and provide service between any two points on
the railroad's system; mandate that railroad companies enter into reciprocal switching agree-
ments upon an STB determination; require the STB to refer certain cases to binding arbitration;
and empower the STB to investigate railroad company violations on its own initiative.
159. Sen. Dorgan Calls for More Competitive Rail Industry, Disaster Aid for Family Farmers,
Ranchers, U.S. FED. NEWS, Jan. 15, 2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR 1234694.
160. S. 772, 110th Cong. (2007). A press release regarding S. 772 is available at http://www.
prnewswire.com/news/index-mail.shtml?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/03-15-2007/00045473
42&EDATE= (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
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not necessarily captive shippers.161 Rather, "captive" is a term that
refers to shippers in markets where no "effective competition from
other rail carriers or modes of transportation for the transportation to
which a rate applies" exists. 162 Thus non-captive shippers that are
served by only one railroad have little basis for complaint, as, by defi-
nition, other modes of transportation are available to ship their prod-
ucts, and therefore create competition in their market.163 With
competition from other modes of transportation present, non-captive
shippers' justification for reregulation desists. Captive shippers, how-
ever, have a legitimate gripe.164 Without effective competition to drive
down railroads' rates, captive shippers pay much higher rates, prima-
rily due to the railroad industry's demand structure and differential
pricing.165 But even captive shippers are protected from anticompeti-
tive behavior or market abuse on the part of railroads; the STB rate
challenge safeguards currently in place offer fair and adequate ave-
nues for redress. 166 The strongest protection that the STB offers ship-
pers, however, also provides the strongest argument against
reregulation: the STB's charge to protect the public interest.1 67 By
weighing the public interest in short-term versus long-term benefits,
the STB ensures that shippers have a railroad industry to rely on
twenty years down the road.168
A. Competition from Other Modes of Transportation
Only where a railroad has market dominance is a shipper "cap-
tive. ' 169 Otherwise, shippers are protected from market abuse by
competition against the railroad industry vis-A-vis other transportation
industries. 170 For instance, take the case of a grain shipper in North
Dakota whose grain elevators sit alongside tracks served by only one
railroad. Let us assume that the grain shipper has been shipping its
crop via railroad for the last fifty years, and that, as a steady customer,
it has been assessed an increasingly greater portion of the railroad's
161. See supra Part III.B.1. See also supra text accompanying note 146.
162. 49 U.S.C. § 10707(a) (2005) (emphasis added). See also Major Issues in Rate Cases, STB
Ex Parte No. 657 (Sub-No. 1), 2006 WL 3087168, at *4 (S.T.B. Oct. 30, 2006).
163. § 10707(a).
164. See infra Part V.B.
165. See supra note 105.
166. See supra Part III.B.1.
167. 49 U.S.C. § 10705(a)(1) (2005). Indeed, the American public has a strong interest in hav-
ing a healthy rail industry now and well into the future.
168. See infra Part V.D.
169. See supra Part III.B.1.
170. See 49 U.S.C. § 10707 (2005).
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common costs over that period.171 Because it shoulders a greater pro-
portion of the railroad's common costs than a similarly situated new
or sporadic shipper would, the overall rate for the current year's ship-
ment is therefore relatively high. However, the grain shipper also has
at its disposal a trucking company that can carry out the shipments,
albeit at a greater cost or over a longer period of time.' 72 Unless the
STB determines the competition from the trucking company to be in-
effective, 73 the grain shipper's decision to ship via the railroad despite
the relatively high rates represents an economic determination that
the railroad's service is more beneficial to the shipper than that of the
trucking company. In such a hypothetical situation, the market func-
tions properly and the best quality service for the price wins out. Ab-
sent a determination by the STB that a railroad company has market
dominance, adequate competition exists in a shipper's market to safe-
guard it against market abuse on the part of the railroad. 174
B. Adequate Safeguards for Captive Shippers
Captive shippers have a legitimate gripe when it comes to their pro-
test of high rates, but reregulation is not the cure to their ailment. The
captive shippers' problematic situation is unique to the railroad indus-
try, largely because railroad is the only mode of transportation in
which the industry's companies carry the burden of maintaining the
ways over which its carriers move.1 75 In contradistinction to railroads,
trucks travel over roads ultimately financed by tax dollars and barges
over water that need not be maintained. 176 The result is that railroad
companies must recoup their common operating costs either through
rates paid by their customers or by an alternative source.177 The prac-
tice of differential pricing puts a large onus of recouping common
171. See supra text accompanying note 105 (discussing differential pricing).
172. There may also be other considerations, such as degree of risk, coordination with buyers,
etc.
173. See § 10707.
174. The internal structure of the Staggers Act and national rail policy thereafter reflect this.
See Staggers Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980).
175. See supra text accompanying note 33.
176. The decision to have railroads be served by the same companies that own them goes back
to the early days of the railroad when individuals owned their own cars and pulled them by
horse. Substantial problems developed when parties would meet each other in the middle of a
track traveling in opposite directions and one would have to remove its equipment so the other
could pass. See supra text accompanying note 33.
177. Private funds are also a source of recouping common costs for railroads. But in order to
attract private capital, return on investment must be competitive with other markets. Rate regu-
lation that would result in less profits for railroad companies would also detract private invest-
ment, resulting in less reinvestment in infrastructure and ultimately poorer service. See GAO
REPORT, supra note 23, at 55.
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costs on shippers in markets lacking competition from other modes of
transportation, which unequally burdens those captive shippers. 178
But even captive shippers are protected by the STB from market
abuse or anticompetitive behavior on the part of railroad companies.
The STB's rate reasonableness analysis has in place adequate safe-
guards to prevent market abuse. Upon receiving a complaint from the
shipper, the STB can find a rate unreasonable only if the rate is equal
to or exceeds 180% of the variable cost of the shipment and the rail-
road has market dominance over the shipper.179 Only shippers that
establish market dominance, captive shippers, present a difficult prob-
lem to resolve. Contrarily, non-captive shippers have other modes of
transportation at their disposal, and thus are subject to the competi-
tion of the market. While the captive shipper may argue that the
STB's analysis unfairly fails to take into account the relatively large
percentage of common costs that the shipper is subjected to in the
challenged rate, it would also have to concede that it is paying less in
common costs than if the railroad instead had to include the same
common costs being charged to the captive shipper in a rate bid in a
more competitive market and lost the bid to another mode of trans-
portation. Such a loss of business would ultimately shift a greater por-
tion of common costs to the shipper, further increasing its rate. The
STB's analysis takes into account this precarious problem unique to
the railroad industry by setting the rate reasonableness threshold on
the basis of variable cost only.180
C. The Public Interest: Long-Term versus Short-Term Benefits
The STB is charged with overseeing the railroad industry in a man-
ner that protects the public interest in having reliable, efficient rail
transportation. 181 With this function comes the responsibility of ana-
lyzing the long-term and short-term consequences of certain regula-
tory measures, as well as the relative desirability of implementing such
measures. Shippers' proposals for injecting competition into the rail-
road industry share a common thread: each proposal offers moderate
short-term benefits at the expense of certain long-term detriment.
First, each proposal seeks to inject competition into the railroad in-
dustry in order to lower rates without considering the competition
that the railroad industry faces from other modes of transportation.
178. See supra text accompanying note 105.
179. Major Issues in Rate Cases, STB Ex Parte No. 657 (Sub-No. 1), 2006 WL 3087168, at *4
(S.T.B. Oct. 30, 2006).
180. See supra text accompanying note 105.
181. See supra Part III.B.3.
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Forced competition that initially results in lower rates for shippers
would also prevent railroad companies from recovering their common
costs of operation. In order to recoup those costs, a railroad company
would have no choice but to include those costs in bids in markets
where competition from other transportation modes is fierce, thus
presenting the possibility that it would not get the shipping contract.
Thus, the railroad company would have to recoup an even greater per-
centage of its common costs from captive shippers, a result the ship-
pers likely did not intend. 182 Second, the moderate benefit of lower
rates for a time carries with it collateral detriment. Mandating recipro-
cal switching, for example, would entail considerable coordination be-
tween railroad companies, resulting in lost time and higher common
costs. Those costs would be passed on to shippers (and ultimately con-
sumers) in the form of higher rates. Forced trackage rights and termi-
nal agreements present maintenance allocation problems: where one
railroad company is deriving a larger benefit from a shipper by run-
ning trains over another railroad company's tracks than the railroad
company that owns the tracks, the owner lacks the incentive to main-
tain those tracks. The result is decreased efficiency, poor track mainte-
nance, and, ultimately, lower safety standards. While forced
competition may drive rates downward at first, a practical analysis of
the proposals put forth by shippers reveals that forced, artificial com-
petition would result in lost time and money and would harm the in-
dustry as a whole over the long run.183 Such a downfall of the
American railroad industry would inevitably affect the United States'
economic position in the world; a less reliable and less efficient rail
182. Woodman & Starke sum up this argument eloquently:
Any mandated reduction in rates ... would have a destructive effect on the rail carri-
ers' ability to differentially price. Any such mandated reduction would require rail car-
riers to increase rates on other traffic. As a result, traffic subject to intermodal
competition would shift to other transportation modes where it could move at lower
rates, leaving the rail carriers with less market share and decreased sources of revenue
to cover their costs. Any contribution made by those shippers to capital and operating
costs would be lost, forcing carriers to make up that shortfall through rate increases on
the remaining traffic to the extent competitive pressures permit. The ultimate effect
would be a loss of the ability to differentially price rail service, resulting in rate in-
creases, lost traffic, decline in revenues, lost jobs, and deterioration in service-the
same litany of woes, it should be noted, that characterized the rail industry in the days
of significant Government regulation.
Woodman & Starke, supra note 16, at 282.
183. See id. Joint trackage rights and reciprocal switching occur in the open market, without
having to be forced. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 44-48. Mandating the shippers' propos-
als would upset the balance of resource allocation and lead to inefficiency and lower safety
standards.
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transportation system impinges the nation's ability to export its prod-
ucts and ultimately compete with other nations on the global market.
Finally, the main reason that reregulation is not the proper solution
to shippers' cries for rate relief is that the economic atmosphere in the
next twenty years requires investment in infrastructure today.184 Stud-
ies predict that the demand on the railroad industry is going to in-
crease by more than fifty percent, and that the ever-aging
infrastructure of the national railroad system is going to require sub-
stantial refurbishment in order to handle that demand. 185 The sources
of capital for reinvestment are few and far between: federal subsidy,
private reinvestment by the railroads themselves, or an innovative
cost-sharing arrangement. As the regulatory framework stands today,
railroads are beginning to earn substantial income which they are gen-
erously reinvesting in infrastructure. 186 The last two years of record
income by the four largest railroads has led to record investment in
infrastructure and increasing capacity. Although captive shippers cer-
tainly have cause to demand relief from high rates, reregulation would
be a short term solution with colossally negative long-term
consequences. 187
D. Looking Forward: Suggestions for Salvage
Shippers' complaints of high rates ultimately stem from a problem
that has no easy solution. While their grievances focus on the lack of
competition within the railroad industry, the root of their problem is
the demand structure and differential pricing method unique to the
railroad industry. 18 8 The hard problem that needs to be resolved in
order for the American railroad industry to survive is the problem of
railroad companies recouping their common costs of operation. Be-
cause the cost of maintaining rail lines is constant and not tied to de-
mand, railroad companies have significant outlay costs. 189 Their return
on investment does not adequately cover their operation costs, as evi-
denced by a near forty billion dollar shortfall between 1981 and
184. GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 54.
185. The studies discussed in the GAO REPORT, supra note 23, project that demand for
freight services will increase between thirty-two and ninety-nine percent. One study estimates
that four billion dollars annually in reinvestment will be needed to meet that demand. GAO
REPORT, supra note 23, at 54.
186. POLICY AND ECON. DEP'T, Assoc. OF AM. R.R., OVERVIEW OF R.R. REREGULATION
(2007), available at http://www.aar.org/GetFile.asp?File-ID=830 (stating that railroads rein-
vested $375 billion in infrastructure between 1980 and 2006).
187. See supra note 182.
188. See supra note 105.
189. See supra text accompanying note 105.
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2005.190 In order to bridge that gap, railroad companies rely on private
investment, which must be competitive with other markets to attract
capital. 191 The practice of differential pricing enables railroad compa-
nies to recover a larger portion of their common costs from steady and
captive shippers currently, but as other modes of transportation be-
come more competitive in those markets railroad companies will be
left without any source of recouping those costs. 192 The problem is a
tough one, and, to date, only by charging their most reliable customers
the highest rates are railroad companies able to sustain the railroad
infrastructure and industry-this seems an odd way of rewarding loy-
alty indeed. But differential pricing is the best solution to the common
costs problem to date, and much more beneficial to the nation as a
whole than reregulation. 193 Perhaps the STB can request innovative
proposals regarding common cost allocation among shippers, railroad
companies, and taxpayers in a more equitable manner. The problem,
however, is not going to solve itself and promises to be a thorn in the
railroad industry's side in the near future. Only by remedying that
problem can shippers and railroad companies both benefit and opti-
mally serve the nation together.
VI. CONCLUSION
The importance of competition in a market economy cannot be
overstated. However, shippers' assertion that an absence of competi-
tion within the railroad industry translates to monopoly power in the
freight transportation market is simply incorrect. The railroad indus-
try must compete with other modes of transportation for shipping
contracts in most of the markets it serves; such competition provides
shippers the structural protection of the market against possible eco-
nomic abuse by railroad companies. Because the public interest is also
protected by market forces, reregulation is unnecessary and would
only harm the future of the railroad industry. The next twenty years
promise to put an unprecedented demand on the efficient rail system
that the railroad industry's escape from heavy regulation created. By
maintaining a low level of economic regulation, the federal govern-
ment will enable the nation's railroad companies to reinvest in the
nation's infrastructure, thereby avoiding a slew of foreseeable national
problems before they materialize while maintaining the United States'
190. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, WHY THE RAIL REREGULATION DEBATE IS
IMPORTANT (2006), available at http://www.aar.org/GetFile.asp?FileID=109.
191. See supra note 177.
192. See supra note 182.
193. Id.
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economic position in the global market. Such is the federal govern-
ment's responsibility to the nation, its citizens, and the many genera-
tions of Americans that will one day inherit a greater nation than did
their ancestors.
